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Pennsylvania's Accountant-Client Privilege: An
Asset with Liabilities
Rev. Martin R. Bartel, OSB*
The purpose of the accountant-client privilege is to insure an atmosphere
wherein the client will transmit all relevant information to his accountant
without any fear of any future disclosure in subsequent litigation. Without
an atmosphere of confidentiality the client might withhold facts he consid-
ers unfavorable to his situation thus rendering the accountant powerless to
adequately perform the services he renders.1
Accountants, their clients, and attorneys for both parties are no
doubt generally aware of the accountant-client privilege and feel
some assurance knowing that, when faced with a summons or sub-
poena, the privilege may be invoked to prevent disclosure of infor-
mation which clients have revealed to their accountant. Perhaps,
too, they derive a certain amount of professional pride knowing
that the state holds the bond between accountant and client in
such high esteem that, like the attorney-client, husband-wife, and
priest-penitent relationships, protection of the accountant-client
relationship outweighs the competing interest of presenting all rel-
evant evidence at trial. Nevertheless, significant limitations on the
accountant-client privilege exist in the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, and accountants and attorneys should be cognizant of them
so as not to be lured into a false sense of security.
This article will examine the Pennsylvania accountant-client
privilege by discussing the legislative history of the statute and rel-
evant cases construing the statute. Furthermore, the coverage of
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cent Seminary (1984); M.B.A., Bowling Green State University (1984); B.B.A., Temple Uni-
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1. Gearhart v Etheridge, 208 SE2d 460, 461 (Ga 1974) (exclusive language in
original).
2. 63 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9.11a provides:
Except by permission of the client or person or entity engaging him or the heirs,
614 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 30:613
the privilege, the conditions of its assertion, the type of informa-
tion protected, waiver of the privilege and exceptions to its appli-
cability will also be treated. Lastly, the article will touch on the
availability of the Pennsylvania privilege in federal and tax cases
and discuss circumstances where an accountant engaged by an at-
torney may be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
PENNSYLVANIA'S ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Pennsylvania, like approximately half of the other states,3 pro-
vides for a statutory accountant-client privilege, although, com-
pared to the other states, the Pennsylvania statute has been char-
acterized as one of the most restrictive in application.4 In general,
the privilege prohibits the disclosure of any information told to the
accountant while employed in a confidential relationship with a cli-
ent.' Unlike the attorney-client and the husband-wife privileges, 6
successors or personal representatives of such client or person or entity, a certified
public accountant, public accountant, partnership or corporation, holding a license to
practice under this act, or a person employed by a certified public accountant, public
accountant, partnership, or a director of or a person employed by a professional cor-
poration holding a license to practice under this act, or an associate of or a person
employed by a professional association holding a license to practice under this act
shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily, disclose or divulge information of
which he may have become possessed relative to and in connection with any profes-
sional services as a certified public accountant, public accountant, partnership or cor-
poration. The information derived from or as the result of such professional services
shall be deemed confidential and privileged: Provided, however, That nothing herein
shall be taken or construed as prohibiting the disclosure of information required to be
disclosed by the standards of the profession in reporting on the examination of finan-
cial statements, or in making disclosures in a court of law or in disciplinary investiga-
tions or proceedings when the professional services of the certified public accountant,
public accountant, partnership or corporation are at issue in an action, investigation
or proceeding in which the certified public accountant, public accountant, partnership
or corporation are parties.
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9.11a (Purdon Supp 1989).
3. Causey and McNair, An Analysis of State Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes
and Public Policy Implications for the Accountant-Client Relationship, 27 Am Bus L J 535
(1990).
4. Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A Critical
Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, 66 Mich L Rev 1264, 1268 (1968) (this
was written in 1968 before the more recent amendments to Pennsylvania's accountant-client
privilege statute, see notes 16-22 and accompanying text).
5. See generally Annotation, Privilege Against Disclosure of Matters Arising Out of
Transactions or Relationship Between Accountant and Client, 38 ALR2d 670 (1954).
6. These were the only two privileges recognized at common law. Dean Wigmore, 8
Evidence §§ 2290, 2227 at 542, 211 (McNaughton rev ed 1961).
Dean Wigmore provides four conditions which are necessary to establish a privilege:
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory main-
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the accountant-client privilege is not recognized at common law,"
nor is it recognized in the states, except where expressly provided
by statute.' Because the accountant-client privilege statute is in
derogation of common law, and because it precludes judicial access
to relevant evidence, a stance contrary to the public policy of full
disclosure of all pertinent information during litigation, the privi-
lege is strictly construed by the courts. In other words, any change
in the common law effected by the statute must be clearly ex-
pressed by the explicit language of the statute and the privilege
must not be given any broader scope than appears on its face.9
RELATIONSHIP TO THE ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
From the outset, it is necessary to note that the accountant-cli-
ent privilege is separate and distinct from the ethical duty of an
accountant to maintain confidentiality. In general, privileged com-
munications are confidential, but not all confidential communica-
tions are privileged.
The obligation of confidentiality is grounded in Ethics Rule 301
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA).Y° This rule provides that a member in public practice
tenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which, in the opinion of the community, ought to be
sedulously fostered; and
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tions must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.
Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2285 at - (emphasis in original) (cited within this note).
7. Stone and Liebman, Testimonial Privileges 67 (1983), citing In re John Doe
Corp., 675 F2d 482, 488 (2d Cir 1982).
8. See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 32-749 (West 1986); 1987 Colo Rev Stat §
13-90-107; Fla Stat Ann § 473.316 (West 1981); Ga Code Ann § 43-3-32 (Michie 1988); Idaho
Code § 9-203A (1979); Ill Ann Stat ch 111, § 5533 (Smith-Hurd Supp 1989); Ind Code § 25-
2-1-23 (1988); Kan Stat Ann § 1-401 (1982); Ky Rev Ann Stat § 325.440 (Supp 1988); La
Rev Stat Ann § 37:87 (West 1988); 32 Me Rev Stat Ann § 12279 (1988); Md Cts & Jud Proc
Code Ann § 9-110 (1984); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 339.713 (West Supp 1989); Miss Code §
73-33-16 (Supp 1988); Mo Rev Stat § 326.151 (1989); Mont Code Ann § 37-50-402 (1987);
Nev Rev Stat §§ 49.185, 49.195, 49.205 (1986); NM Stat Ann § 38-6-6 (1987); 63 Pa Cons
Stat Ann § 9.11a (Purdon Supp 1989); 20 PR Laws Ann § 790 (1988); RI Gen Laws § 5-3-22
(1987); Tenn Code Ann § 62-1-116 (1986); 26 Vt Stat Ann § 82 (Equity Supp 1988); Wash
Rev Code Ann § 18.04.405 (West 1989).
9. United States v Bowman, 358 F2d 421, 423 (3d Cir 1966); Rubin v Katz, 347 F
Supp 322, 324 (E D Pa 1972); Sansom Refining Co. v Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 92
FRD 440 (E D Pa 1981).
10. AICPA, AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 301 (Confidential Client In-
formation) (as amended May 20, 1991). The full text of the Rule reads:
A member in public practice shall not disclose any confidential information without
the specific consent of the client.
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shall not disclose any confidential client information without the
specific consent of the client.11 However, this prohibition against
disclosure can be overcome in the case of a validly issued and le-
gally enforceable subpoena or summons as well as in the case of an
investigation by a disciplinary body or in connection with a quality
review.
The obligation of confidentiality also arises from state agencies
which regulate professional conduct. For example, in Pennsylvania
the State Board of Accountancy imposes a legal requirement of
confidentiality upon certified public accountants (CPAs): "A licen-
see shall not without the consent of his client disclose any confi-
dential information pertaining to his client obtained in the course
of performing professional services except to the extent provided
by section 11.1 of the act (63 P.S. § 9.11a). ' ' 2
Thus, despite the ethical duty to maintain confidentiality, client
information remains subject to disclosure in court and in other
proceedings.' In contrast to the ethical rule, however, the account-
ant-client privilege gives the client the option to prevent disclosure
This rule shall not be construed (1) to relieve a member of his or her professional
obligations under rules 202 and 203 [dealing with the standards of the profession], (2)
to affect in any way the member's obligation to comply with a validly issued and
enforceable subpoena or summons, (3) to prohibit review of a member's professional
practice under AICPA or state CPA society authorization, or (4) to preclude a mem-
ber from initiating a complaint with or responding to any inquiry made by a recog-
nized investigative or disciplinary body.
Members of a recognized investigative or disciplinary body and professional prac-
tice reviewers shall not use to their own advantage or disclose any member's confiden-
tial client information that comes to their attention in carrying out their official re-
sponsibilities. However, this prohibition shall not restrict the exchange of information
with a recognized investigative or disciplinary body or affect, in any way, compliance
with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons.
Id.
The Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants (PICPA) has an identical eth-
ics rule and the Institute of Mangement Accountants (IMA) has a shorter, but substantially
similar one.
See Wagenheim v Alexander Grant & Co., 482 NE2d 955 (Ohio App 1983), for a case of
first impression in the United States where the court found no cause of action against an
accounting firm for breaching the ethical duty of confidentiality. However, although no ex-
press written agreement was ever signed, the court determined that a contractual relation-
ship existed between the accounting firm and the client and the code of professional con-
duct provided an implied term in the contract requiring the firm to maintain confidentiality.
Thus, disclosure of confidential information constituted a breach of contract.
11. See note 10 for the text of Ethics Rule 301.
12. 40 Pa Code § 11.30 (1991) (exclusive language in original).
13. See generally Dennis, When Can Confidential Client Information Be Disclosed?,
21 Prac Acct 42 (Apr 1988).
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of the protected information in judicial proceedings.14
Moreover, the courts are without jurisdiction to enforce provi-
sions of the codes of ethics and rules of conduct which are applica-
ble to accountants. Unlike the jurisdiction to enforce the canons of
ethics for attorneys, which is based on the regulatory power of
courts over members of the bar, there is no analogous basis for the
court to enforce such rules for accountants.15
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The section on privileged communication and CPAs was origi-
nally enacted in 1961 as an amendment16 to Pennsylvania's then
existing legislation 17 regulating the accounting profession (herein-
after "the CPA Law"). In 1974, the provision was rewritten to ex-
tend the privilege to professional corporations and professional as-
sociations holding a permit to practice under the CPA Law as well
as to directors, associates and employees of such corporations and
associations. The 1974 amendment to the accountant-client statute
also omitted the exclusion for information obtained by the ac-
countant as a result of "the examination of, audit of or report on
any financial statements, books, records, or accounts which [the ac-
countant] may be engaged to make or requested by a prospective
client to discuss.""' In its stead, perhaps due to undesirable court
decisions construing this part of the statute," the legislature in-
14. See Causey and McNair, 27 Am Bus L J at 538 (cited in note 3).
15. Rubin v Katz, 347 F Supp 322, 323 (E D Pa 1972).
16. Act of September 2, 1961, P L 1165, No 524. The original amendment read:
Privileged Communication.-Except by permission of the client or person or firm
or corporation engaging him or the heirs, successors or personal representatives of
such client or person or firm or corporation, a certified public accountant or a person
employed by a certified public accountant shall not be required to, and shall not
voluntarily, disclose or divulge information of which he may have become possessed
relative to and in connection with any professional services as a certified public ac-
countant other than the examination of audit of or report on any financial state-
ments, books, records or accounts, which he may be engaged to make or requested by
a prospective client to discuss. The information derived from or as the result of such
professional services shall be deemed confidential and privileged: Provided, however,
That nothing herein shall be construed as modifying, changing or affecting the crimi-
nal or bankruptcy laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States.
Id.
Prior to the passage of this original amendment in 1961, privileged communications were
not recognized as between a client and his accountant. United States v Stoehr, 100 F Supp
143 (E D Pa 1951), aff'd, 196 F2d 276 (3d Cir 1952).
17. Act of May 26, 1947, P L 318, No 140 (hereinafter "the CPA Law").
18. The Act of December 30, 1974, P L 1122, No 362, amended the earlier version of
the statute. See note 16 for the full text of the earlier provision.
19. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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serted a different exclusionary clause. The new exclusion clarified
the fact that the privilege does not prohibit the disclosure of infor-
mation required by standards of the profession nor does it prohibit
disclosures in judicial proceedings or disciplinary investigations
where the accountant, professional corporation or professional as-
sociation is a party or their services are at issue. At the same time,
the legislature omitted the provision that the privilege shall not be
"construed as modifying, changing or affecting the existing crimi-
nal 'or bankruptcy laws of this Commonwealth or of the United
States."2 0
Two years later, in 1976, the legislature deleted references in the
statute to professional corporations and professional associations
and made the privilege available to public accountants, partner-
ships and corporations holding permits to practice under the CPA
Law.2 An amendment in 1984 left the substance of the statute un-
changed, but made editorial changes to reflect the fact that, ad-
ministratively, "permits" to practice had been replaced by
"licenses."22
COVERAGE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The accountant-client privilege by its very name applies to ac-
countants. However, precisely what constitutes an accountant for
purposes of determining the privilege's coverage and what other
related professionals are included under the umbrella protecting
the accountant is subject to siatutory definition. Furthermore, ju-
dicial interpretation of the privilege's applicability has looked to
the geographic location where the privileged communication took
place and the reasonable expectation of the parties regarding the
availability of the jurisdiction's privilege under the circumstances.
Currently, Pennsylvania's statutory accountant-client privilege is
available only to CPAs and public accountants holding a state li-
cense to practice, and to their employees and associates. 2' Thus, it
follows that unlicensed professionals retained to render accounting
20. Act of December 30, 1974, P L 1122, No 362.
21. Act of December 8, 1976, P L 1280, No 286.
22. Act of March 7, 1984, P L 106, No 23, § 15 (effective Apr 1, 1984).
23. 63 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9.11a (Purdon Supp 1989).
In Commonwealth v England, 74 Pa D & C 2d 489, 494 (Pa Corn P1, Bucks Cty 1976), an
opinion issued under the prior language of the accountant-client statute which extended the
privilege only to certified public accountants, see note 21 and accompanying text, the court
refused to extend the accountant-client privilege to an individual rendering professional ac-
counting services because he at all times in question was not "certified" within the defini-
tional meaning of the CPA Law.
Vol. 30:613
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services may not invoke the accountant-client claim of privilege.
Although the statute is not explicit on this issue, judicial inter-
pretation suggests that even licensed accountants can claim the
privilege only when the confidential communication occurred in
circumstances where the parties could reasonably expect the Penn-
sylvania statute to apply. In James Talcott, Inc. v C.I.T. Corp.,24
the plaintiffs in an Arizona lawsuit sought to depose an accountant
working in the Pittsburgh office of a national accounting firm. The
testimony sought by the plaintiffs concerned information and
records derived from services provided by the accountant while
working in the Massachusetts office of the same accounting firm.
Despite Pennsylvania's statutory accountant-client privilege, the
court decided that the privilege could not be claimed because Mas-
sachusetts did not protect communications between accountants
and clients, and the expectations of the parties as to the confiden-
tiality of the communications would have been based on Massa-
chusetts law.
The information which plaintiffs seek was obtained by [the accountant]
in the course of providing accounting services to [his client corporations] in
Massachusetts. Consequently, the expectations of the parties as to the con-
fidentiality of the communications would be based upon Massachusetts law.
Therefore, the scope of the accountant-client privilege in this case should
not be broader than that provided by Massachusetts law. Any other result
would deprive the parties to the litigation of information which may pro-
duce a more just result without strengthening the accountant-client
relationship.
Massachusetts law does not protect from disclosure in court proceedings
communications between accountants and clients. Therefore [the account-
ant] cannot refuse to disclose the information which plaintiffs seek on the
ground that it constitutes a privileged communication. 5
The Pennsylvania version of the accountant-client privilege spe-
cifically provides coverage to all employees of the accountant, to
directors of a corporation and to associates of an association hold-
ing licenses to practice under the CPA Law. However, as one
writer has pointed out, while the extension of the privilege to these
other groups may settle the question of privilege for these specifi-
24. 14 Pa D & C 3d 204 (Pa Corn PI, Allegheny Cty 1980).
25. James Talcott, Inc., 14 Pa D & C 3d at 205-06. The court also noted that this
result was supported by the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 139 (1971), which
provides that, unless it would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum, non-
privileged evidence under the law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the communication should be admitted even though under the local law of the forum it
would be privileged. Id at 206.
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cally enumerated groups, serious consequences may result. For ex-
ample, a scenario where one licensed accountant, because of a
heavy workload or a special project, hires a second unlicensed ac-
countant, a stranger to the original accountant-client relationship,
to provide professional assistance could present problems. In the
event of subsequent litigation, the court might have to determine
whether this second accountant held the status of employee or in-
dependent contractor. If the second accountant is viewed by the
court as an independent contractor, the disclosure to him or her
would be improper, resulting perhaps in waiver of the privilege.26
A similar problematic situation could involve a consultation be-
tween accountants based on personal friendship or professional
courtesy rather than a remunerative engagement. In the former
case, a party to a lawsuit could make a strong argument that the
accountant consulted was nobody's client and thus was not cloaked
by the accountant-client privilege and the protection it affords.1
7
Despite these potential problems, the accountant-client privilege
remains available to licensed CPAs and public accountants and
their related personnel. The accountant's mere physical presence
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not guarantee the con-
fidentiality of accountant-client communications. Rather, the par-
ties must have a reasonable expectation that the Pennsylvania ac-
countant-client statute will indeed be applicable in the situation.
ASSERTING THE PRIVILEGE
Although the various states differ on these issues, Pennsylvania
provides its own answers to the questions of exactly who the privi-
lege "belongs" to, who may invoke the privilege to avoid divulging
the confidential information and whether the claim of privilege
survives the death of the client. Furthermore, because Pennsylva-
nia vests the privilege in the client rather than the accountant,
cases of joint clients, such as a corporation and its shareholders or
a husband and wife, present special problems when one client at-
tempts to assert the claim of privilege against the other.
Pennsylvania's accountant-client privilege provides that the
privilege may be waived by the client or by the client's personal
representatives or heirs or successors. To the extent that the power
to waive implies the power to invoke, it can be said that the privi-
26. David A. Larson, Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes: A Clear Need for Re-
form, 8 Seton Hall Legis J 209, 211 (1984).
27. Larson, 8 Seton Hall Legis J at 211-12 (cited in note 26).
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lege belongs to the client.2s Furthermore, it must be the client who
asserts and claims the privilege and raises any objection. 2 The
plain language of the statute makes it clear that the privilege sur-
vives the death of the client.30 Consequently, heirs, successors or
personal representatives may step forward and invoke the privilege
on behalf of the client."
The privileged communication may not be divulged voluntarily
and it may not be mandated, except with the permission of the
person or entity engaging the accountant for professional services.
However, a court has ruled that the privilege may not be asserted
by a corporation to preclude a major shareholder seeking to vindi-
cate its rights from inquiring into matters vital to the shareholders'
cause of action. 2
Other than the case just cited, there is no Pennsylvania case law
on whether communications from a member of a collective entity
are privileged as to other members of the entity. Thus, the follow-
ing issues remain unsettled: (1) whether the accountant-client priv-
ilege protects a corporation from disclosure in a shareholder's de-
rivative suit or an action against the corporation based on breach
of fiduciary duty, and (2) whether communications by a partner or
joint venturer to an accountant are privileged as to the other part-
ners or venturers.
To gain some feel for how these issues might eventually be re-
28. Accord Gatewood v United States Cellular Corp., 124 FRD 504, 506 (D DC
1989); Sansom Refining Co. v Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 92 FRD 440, 441 (E D Pa
1981); James Talcott, Inc., 14 Pa D & C 3d at 207, citing Ernst & Ernst v Underwriters
Nat'l Assurance Co., 381 NE2d 897 (Ind Ct App 1978) ("the accountant-client privilege
belongs only to the client").
Furthermore, "in general, the privilege 'belongs' to the person who previously disclosed
the information in confidence to the person from whom that information is now sought to be
obtained." Tannenbaum, Liquidating Receiver of Computab, Inc. v May Dept. Stores Co.,
65 Pa D & C 2d 700, 702 (Pa Corn Pl, Allegheny Cty 1974) (refusing to extend a grant of
privilege to the banker-customer relationship).
29. Continental Cas. Co. v Dickerson, 338 F Supp 759, 761 (W D Pa 1972).
30. 63 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9.11a (Purdon Supp 1989).
31. See generally The Accountant-Client Privilege: Does It and Should It Survive
the Death of the Client?, 1987 BYU L Rev 1271 (1987).
32. Albert M. Greenfield Foundation v Bankers Securities Corp., 7 Pa D & C 3d 535,
543 (Pa Corn Pl, Philadelphia 1978) (hereinafter "Greenfield"). In Greenfield, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants illegally voted treasury stock at a board election. Defendants,
asserting a claim of confidentiality based on the accountant-client privilege, sought to refuse
to answer interrogatories regarding the disputed designation of treasury stock in the annual
financial statements. The court overruled objections based on the accountant-client privi-
lege and ordered defendants to answer the interrogatories, reasoning that "it is inconceiv-
able that professional accounting standards would not demand that the accountants explain
the circumstances underlying the disputed designation." Greenfield, 7 Pa D & C 3d at 542.
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solved in Pennsylvania courts, it is helpful to look to the law in
other jurisdictions which, like Pennsylvania, have no specific provi-
sions addressing these issues. For example, the Colorado Supreme
Court has concluded that a corporation cannot invoke the privilege
against its stockholders in a shareholders' derivative suit because
CPAs are hired for the benefit of all corporate stockholders and,
therefore, concealment of information from the stockholders of in-
formation given to the accountant by the corporation is forbid-
den." In the case of joint venturers, the Georgia Supreme Court
has ruled that where an accountant is jointly employed, communi-
cations between each of the clients and the accountant are privi-
leged as to all outside parties but not with regard to the other
principals involved.3 4 Interestingly, some legislatures have specifi-
cally enacted statutes which make the accountant-client privilege
unavailable in any of these kinds of situations. 5
The availability of the privilege in divorce proceedings, where
husband and wife were previously joint clients, has not been
treated by Pennsylvania courts either.3 6 Regardless, a sense of jus-
tice and fair play suggests that divorce cases deserve an exception
to the accountant-client privilege. "One spouse should not be able
to avoid an equitable alimony obligation or child support award by
shielding his or her actual financial condition behind the account-
ant-client privilege.
'3 7
Although there is case law in other jurisdictions to the con-
trary,38 Pennsylvania case law suggests that a trustee in bank-
33. Pattie Lea, Inc. v District Court, 161 Colo 493, 423 P2d 27 (1967). In reaching
this decision, the Colorado court read into the state accountant-client privilege statute an
exception analogous to a common law exception to the attorney-client privilege: when sev-
eral persons employ the same attorney their communications to the attorney are not privi-
leged inter se. The court ruled that the same kind of exception should prevent a corporation
from using the accountant-client privilege in the derivative suit context. Note, 66 Mich L
Rev at 1268 (cited in note 4).
34. Gearhart v Etheridge, 208 SE2d 460 (Ga 1974).
35. See, for example, Nev Rev Stat § 49.205(5) and (6) (1979); Fla Stat Ann §
473.316(4)(c) (West 1991).
36. Other states have, however, found the privilege unavailable where the accountant
provided services to joint husband and wife clients. See Harwood v Randolph Harwood,
Inc., 333 NW2d 609 (Mich App 1983) ("However, the facts appeared to involve separate
engagements for related parties, one of which was the husband's corporation"); Causey and
McNair, 27 Am Bus L J at 543 (cited in note 3); Levin v Levin, 405 A2d 770 (Md App 1979).
See generally Privileged Conversations in the Counting House: The Role of the Accountant,
10 Fam Advoc 31 (1987) (role of the accountant in divorce cases).
37. Larson, 8 Seton Hall Legis J at 217 (cited in note 26).




ruptcy cannot act for the corporation with regard to the privilege.3 9
In James Talcott, Inc., the accountant tried to assert the account-
ant-client privilege with respect to communications to him by cer-
tain client corporations. At the time the accountant was attempt-
ing to claim the privilege, the corporations had been adjudicated
bankrupt, their corporate charters had been voided, and they had
no place of, nor did they conduct any, business. The court said
that the privilege belongs only to the client and, under these cir-
cumstances, there was no entity whose interests would be pro-
tected by the accountant-client privilege. Thus, no one could claim
the privilege.40
In summary, the accountant-client privilege may be invoked by
the client and the client's heirs, successors or personal representa-
tives to prevent disclosures by the accountant. Although the issue
is far from settled, it appears that the privilege may not be as-
serted by a corporation against its stockholders, nor can it be in-
voked by one client to prohibit disclosure to a joint client.
INFORMATION PROTECTED
In general, the Pennsylvania statute provides that information
obtained by the accountant in his or her professional capacity is
within the scope of the privilege. In other words, the privilege op-
erates with regard to communications, written or oral, made to an
accountant by the client in connection with the rendering of pro-
fessional services4' whether that be accounting and auditing ser-
vices, tax practice or management advisory services. The statute
does not cover information communicated from the accountant to
the client or to any other person.
42
One court has had to rule that the privilege does not protect
skills or expertise acquired at setting up books, compiling reports
39. James Talcott, Inc., 14 Pa D & C 3d 204 (1980). Contra Weck, 422 P2d 46 (1967)
(holding that a trustee in bankruptcy can act for the corporation with regard to the account-
ant-client privilege).
40. James Talcott, Inc., 14 Pa D & C 3d at 205, 207. Compare Stone and Liebman,
Testimonial Privileges at 219 (cited in note 7), citing Hare v Family Communications Serv.,
Inc., 334 F Supp 953 (D Md 1971) (Maryland accountant-client privilege did apply to com-
munications made in New York, even though New York did not have an accountant-client
privilege).
41. In order for the statute to be at least prima facially applicable, there must be a
showing that an accountant's services were sought in an accounting capacity. Gatewood v
United States Cellular Corp., 124 FRD 504, 505 (D DC 1989) (applying Pennsylvania law)
(holding that appraisal service was not an accounting function). See notes 67-68 and accom-
panying text.
42. Stauffer Chemical Co. v Keysor-Century Corp., 94 FRD 180 (D Del 1982).
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and dealing with banks.43 These kinds of activities did not amount
to confidential information envisioned by the authors of the appli-
cable section of the CPA Law. 4 Thus, a CPA who used his skills
for a particular company, and acquired considerable knowledge of
the business by doing so, was free to turn his knowledge to his own
use and make himself into a business competitor of his original
client.45
WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE
The accountant-client privilege prohibits the forced disclosure of
certain confidential information between the accountant and the
client. However, there are circumstances in which this protection is
lost by either explicit or implied waiver of the privilege.
The statute expressly provides that a client may waive the ac-
countant-client privilege by consenting to disclosure by the ac-
countant.46 When a client initiates litigation in which communica-
tions with the accountant are relevant, for example in a case where
the client sues the accountant for breach of contract or fiduciary
duty, the privilege is deemed waived. One Pennsylvania case ruled
that the accountant-client privilege did not apply to the facts of
the case, but even if it did, "by placing in issue communications
which they now decline to divulge, defendants have in effect
waived the accountant-client privilege which might have otherwise
attached.
' 47
The court in Sansom Refining Co. v Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc. 45 went further and held that, when the client initiates
a lawsuit in which the client's allegations make relevant informa-
tion and knowledge that is in the possession of the accountant, and
where the information or knowledge would be discoverable from
the client if it was in the client's possession, then the client has, in
43. Agra Enterprises, Inc. v Brunozzi, 448 A2d 579, 582 (Pa Super 1982). One com-
mentator, for reasons unknown to this author, has opined that this case "cannot be consid-
ered reliable as precedent." Causey and McNair, 27 Am Bus L J at 547 n 60 (cited in note
3).
44. Agra, 448 A2d at 582.
45. Id.
46. 63 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9.11a (Purdon Supp 1989).
47. Greenfield, 7 Pa D & C 3d at 543. Accord Continental Cas. Co., 338 F Supp at
761 (privilege is not the plaintiff's but even if it were, the privilege is waived to the extent
that the information is material to plaintiff's claim or the defense thereto).
48. 92 FRD 440 (E D Pa 1981). In Sansom, the defendant sought information relat-
ing to the amount of loss sustained by the plaintiff because of allegedly unauthorized trades
which occurred while the accountants were responsible for supervising the account and
which were investigated by the accountants.
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effect, waived the privilege by initiating the suit. The court added
that the accountant-client privilege could not have been intended
to cloak material that would be discoverable from the client if it
was in the client's possession.49
Another case construing Pennsylvania's accountant-client privi-
lege statute, Nick Istock, Inc. v Research-Cotrell, Inc.,50 held that
a party's calling of a CPA as a witness at trial constitutes a waiver
of any privileged communications relating to the matters at issue
and the privilege cannot be asserted for purposes of preventing
discovery. The privilege will be deemed waived regardless of
whether the accountant would be called as an expert witness or
whether he would testify with respect to the facts of the case.51
EXCEPTIONS
The Pennsylvania statute mentions specific instances where the
circumstances under which the privilege may be invoked are re-
stricted. In general, these situations include the public attest (au-
dit) function and litigation, and disciplinary hearings or investiga-
tions in which the accountant's services are at issue and the
accountant is a party to the action.
Noteworthy in this context is the fact that the legislature has
specifically eliminated the exclusionary language in the statute
that made the accountant-client privilege ineffectual as to existing
criminal laws.52 This amendment by the legislature seemingly
made the privilege available where a client is being prosecuted for
a criminal offense. While this action should hardly be construed as
legislative endorsement of an accountant furthering the endeavors
of the criminally inclined, a client charged with a crime would be
able to erect a barrier to relevant testimony by his or her account-
ant by invoking the accountant-client privilege.
Although one may argue that it is the responsibility of the certified public
accountant to withdraw before a criminal act can be completed, one can
easily imagine the situation in which the client's unlawful intentions are not
entirely apparent until the act has been completed. The client would then
have the power to silence the certified public accountant with a claim of
privilege. The privilege may be asserted regardless of the certified public
accountant's own belief that disclosure is necessary, or society's general con-
49. Sansom, 92 FRD at 441, citing Greenfield, 7 Pa D & C 3d at 543.
50. 74 FRD 150 (W D Pa 1977).
51. Nick Istock, Inc., 74 FRD at 151.
52. See note 20 and accompanying text.
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cern that crimes be identified and prevented.5 3
STANDARDS OF THE PROFESSION
An accountant has duties not only to his or her client, but also
to third parties: investors, creditors and the government. Thus, the
accountant must adhere to professionally imposed standards and
responsibilities and is subject to governmental regulations and
requirements.
Pennsylvania provides that while the accountant-client privilege
may apply in situations where the accountant performs a private,
advisory or consulting function, the privilege does not prohibit an
accountant from making disclosures required by the standards of
the profession in reporting on the examination of financial state-
ments. "The statute, regrettably, does not indicate what the stan-
dards of the accounting profession demand by way of disclosure of
'confidential' information. ' 54 Presumably this provision of the stat-
ute means that the privilege may not be invoked in connection
with disclosures required by generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP) or generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).
In the one Pennsylvania case construing this section of the stat-
ute, the opinion noted that it would be difficult to imagine that the
standards of the accounting profession would not require account-
ants to reveal an explanation of the circumstances underlying a
challenged designation in the annual report of the financial
statements:
It is inconceivable that professional accounting standards would not de-
mand that the accountants explain the circumstances underlying the dis-
puted designation. The accountants included the treasury stock designation
in [their client corporation's] annual report, presumably pursuant to an ex-
amination of [the corporation's] financial affairs, including its financial
statements. Furthermore, given the impact that the resolution of this issue
will undoubtedly have on the question of defendant's liability, the stan-
dards of the profession cannot and should not impede the court's effort to
assure plaintiff the fullest opportunity to prepare its case through the vehi-
cle of discovery.55
53. Larson, 8 Seton Hall Legis J at 213 (cited in note 26). The author recommends
that states without an exception for criminal offenses should consider adopting a provision
that makes the privilege unavailable "where an accountant's services were sought or ob-
tained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud." Id at 214
(emphasis in original).
54. Greenfield, 7 Pa D & C 3d at 541.
55. Id at 542-43 (emphasis in original) (designation concerned treasury stock).
Vol. 30:613626
Accountant-Client Privilege
The court therefore ordered the defendant to provide fuller and
more specific answers to an interrogatory and overruled the de-
fendant's objections based on the accountant-client privilege.
Although the privilege does not protect disclosures required by
GAAS, it would appear to protect related documents supporting
the disclosures. That is, it is possible that an auditor may not have
to testify or produce records concerning: the audit program; evi-
dential matter obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries,
and confirmations; the analysis of internal control; and other notes
and data pertinent to whether the financial statements are pre-
pared in accordance with GAAP.
5
1
Because it may shed some light on judicial thinking on the topic,
it is worth considering three early court cases. These cases were
decided prior to the amendment in 1974, where the accountant-
client privilege contained an exemption clause that withdrew from
the statute's protection information acquired by the accountant as
a result of "the examination of audit of or report on any financial
statements, books, records or accounts, which he may be engaged
to make or requested by a prospective client to discuss. '57 The
courts construing the former statutory exclusion held that the
privilege did not attach to information obtained by the accountant
directly from the client's books and records.5
Another case has ruled that where an accountant examining the
books of a client received verbal clarification concerning what a
certain bookkeeping entry represented, the answer was not covered
by the privilege.59 The answer had to be divulged because, al-
though the information was not taken directly from the books, it
was received in the answer to a question in connection with the
56. Crocker, Accountant's Privileges, 11 Barrister 31, 32 (Summer 1984).
57. See note 18 and accompanying text.
58. Marine Midland Trust Co. of S. NY v Douvanis, 50 Pa D & C 2d 403, 409 (Pa
Corn Pl, Lehigh Cty 1970). The plaintiff in Marine Midland Trust sought to take the depo-
sition of defendant's accountant for the purpose of discovering assets against which execu-
tion might be issued. Defendant and his accountant objected to such discovery, claiming the
information was confidential and privileged. The court compelled the testimony of the ac-
countant, reasoning that the statutory accountant-client privilege in effect at the time did
not extend to the defendant's books and records and, because the accountant's testimony
was limited to facts derived therefrom, the proposed discovery was proper and in accordance
with law. Accord United States v Bowman, 358 F2d 421, 423 (3d Cir 1966) (accountant
must comply with IRS summons because all of the material to which the summons relates
was derived from the books and records of the taxpayer corporation by the accountant or
people working under his supervision and direction) (emphasis in original).
59. Rubin v Katz, 347 F Supp 322, 324 (E D Pa 1972).
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accountant's examination of the books.60 Nor did the privilege at-
tach, in a third case, to explanatory notes and statements made by
the accountant pertinent to the financial statements which he or
she compiled.
6 1
LEGAL OR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In Pennsylvania, the statutory accountant-client privilege does
not apply to communications which are relevant to an action in a
court of law or in disciplinary proceedings conducted by a gov-
erning authority where the professional services of the accountant
are being contested and the accountant is a party.62
FEDERAL LAW AND TAX CASES
Although various states, like Pennsylvania, recognize some form
of testimonial accountant-client privilege by statute, in rejecting
accountant-client and Fifth Amendment privileges for records de-
livered to a tax return preparer, the United States Supreme Court
has decreed that "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists
under federal law, and no state-created, privilege has been recog-
nized in federal cases."' 3 Moreover, concerns which are central to
the system of bankruptcy administration have been found to lie
60. Rubin, 347 F Supp at 324. The accountant had examined the corporate books of a
client and inquired what a $500 entry represented. The information obtained in answer to
the question was excluded from coverage by the privilege because the statute in effect at the
time made an exception for information obtained in connection with an examination or re-
port on any financial statements, books, records or accounts.
61. E. J. McAleer & Co. v Iceland Prod., Inc., 62 Pa D & C 2d 65, 70-71 (Pa Corn P1,
Cumberland Cty 1973). This case was an action for breach of contract to furnish codfish
along with a claim of damages. The court acknowledged the limited accountant-client privi-
lege established by statute, but ruled that the defendant was entitled to not only the plain-
tiff's financial statements because of the statutory exclusion but also the accountant's notes
thereto and any information pertinent to the financial statements compiled by the
accountants.
62. 63 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9.11a (Purdon Supp 1989).
63. Couch v United States, 409 US 322, 335 (1973) (citations omitted). In Couch, the
Supreme Court's refusal to bar the accountant's production of business records pertinent to
tax liability seems to be based on the expectation of privacy. The Court noted that:
[there] could be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an account-
ant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is re-
quired in an income tax return. What information is not disclosed is largely in the
accountant's discretion, not the petitioner's. Indeed, the accountant himself risks
criminal prosecution if he willingly assists in the preparation of a false return.
Couch, 409 US at 335. See also United States v Jaskiewicz, 278 F Supp 525 (E D Pa 1968)
(state-created accountant-client privilege is not applicable in federal criminal trial); United
States v Berkowitz, 355 F Supp 897 (E D Pa 1973) (tax records not protected by account-
ant-client privilege).
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singularly within the realm of federal law rather than state law and
thus Pennsylvania's accountant-client privilege does not apply in
bankruptcy adjudications.6 4 Therefore, in Pennsylvania and else-
where, disadvantaged creditors can expect unrestricted access to
documents in the possession of CPAs relating to a debtor's finan-
cial condition.
Federal courts do not recognize the accountant-client privilege in
federal administrative proceedings either.6 5 However, the Federal
Rules of Evidence stipulate that where state law provides the rule
of decision, privilege is determined in accordance with state law.6
Thus, state-granted statutory privileges would be applied in diver-
sity jurisdiction matters.6
One federal district court decision involving Pennsylvania's stat-
utory accountant-client privilege suggests that, in diversity juris-
diction matters, federal courts may disfavor state law which recog-
nizes privileges and prefer instead state law which permits the
disclosure of all facts relevant to a judicial proceeding. In Gate-
wood v United States Cellular Corp.,"6 a federal magistrate held
that an appraisal performed by a CPA selected by plaintiffs in liti-
gation concerning a limited partnership agreement was not an ac-
64. In re Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 41 Bankr 862 (E D Pa 1984). An
amendment to the CPA Law eliminated the exclusionary language in the statute that made
the accountant-client privilege ineffectual on existing bankruptcy laws. See note 20 and ac-
companying text.
Because the court reached the result that it did, it was not necessary to determine
whether the trustee had the authority to waive a debtor corporation's accountant-client
privilege. It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court has since overruled the analo-
gous Seventh Circuit case cited in the Oxford opinion by holding that a trustee may waive
the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-bankruptcy proceedings. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm. v Weintraub, 471 US 343 (1985).
65. United States v Kelly, 311 F Supp 1216 (E D Pa 1969) (IRS summons); F.T.C. v
St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F2d 731 (7th Cir 1962) (Federal Trade Commission subpoena duces
tecum); Falsone v United States, 205 F2d 734, 739 (5th Cir 1953) (IRS summons); Colton v
United States, 306 F2d 633 (2d Cir 1963) (IRS summons).
66. FRE 501. The Rule reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the Courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in ac-
cordance with State law.
Id.
67. Samuelson v Susen, 576 F2d 546 (3d Cir 1978).
68. 124 FRD 504 (D DC 1989).
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counting function. Therefore, these communications were not pro-
tected by the Pennsylvania accountant-client privilege. Moreover,
the court reasoned that even if the statute would offer protection
to the plaintiffs precluding discovery of the appraisal report and
communications with respect to the appraisal process, the court
would not give extra-territorial recognition to a Pennsylvania stat-
ute in District of Columbia litigation. The court conducted an in-
terest analysis approach and concluded that the District of Colum-
bia's interest in applying its law in the instant proceedings was
stronger than Pennsylvania's because the suit involved a partner-
ship whose managing partner resided in the District of Columbia
and the corporate defendant did business there. In addition, Penn-
sylvania's interest arose solely from the fact that the plaintiffs
communicated with a Pennsylvania accountant. The professional
relationship in Pennsylvania was merely fortuitous and was not
purposely arranged because of the availability of the privilege.6 9
The Third Circuit has had the opportunity to address the choice
of law problem in the context of Pennsylvania's statutory account-
ant-client privilege in Wm. T. Thompson Co. v General Nutrition
Corp.70 In cases involving a combination of federal and state law
claims, the Third Circuit has ruled that, in accordance with Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501,71 the state privilege law would govern in
cases where state law provided the rule of decision. 2 But, in fed-
eral question cases with pendent state law claims, the federal rule
favoring admissibility will prevail despite the existence of pendent
state claims.73
69. Gatewood, 124 FRD at 505-06. Compare Stone and Liebman, Testimonial Privi-
leges at 15 (cited in note 7), citing Celotex Corp. v California Union Ins. Co., 1988 Dist Ct
LEXIS 86-1142 (D DC) (allowing Florida's accountant-client privilege because the relation-
ship and the communications originated there, and both parties reasonably relied on that
state's privilege).
70. 671 F2d 100 (3d Cir 1982).
71. See note 66 for the text of the Rule.
Authors, writing before this decision was rendered, have disagreed as to the impact of
Rule 501 on the accountant-client privilege. One has indicated that the Rule signals the
death knoll for the privilege. Jentz, Accountant Privileged Communications: Is It a Dying
Concept under the New Federal Rules of Evidence?, 11 Am Bus L J 149 (1974). The other
has concluded that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "accountant-client privilege is to
be accorded greater recognition and achieve greater significance." Note, Evidence: The Ac-
countant-Client Privilege under the New Federal Rules of Evidence-New Stature and
New Problems, 28 Okla L Rev 637, 638 (1975). See generally Annotation, Situations in
Which Federal Courts Are Governed by State Law of Privilege under Rule 501 of Federal
Rules of Evidence, 48 ALR Fed 259 (1980).
72. Thompson, 671 F2d at 103.
73. Id at 104.
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The Thompson opinion acknowledged the difficulty of applying
two separate accountant-client disclosure rules with respect to dif-
ferent claims tried by the same jury. Therefore, the court held that
in this litigation, involving allegations of federal antitrust laws as
well as violations of state law, the federal rule permitting disclos-
ure was controlling rather than Pennsylvania's state law privilege
protecting the information:
In this case the anti-trust and state law claims will b'e tried together. Obvi-
ously applying two separate disclosure rules with respect to different claims
tried to the same jury would be unworkable. One rule or the other must
govern. Thus, assuming the Pennsylvania privilege is in fact applicable as a
matter of choice of law, we must decide whether it or the rule of Couch v
United States, [409 US 322 (1973) (holding no federal common law ac-
countant-client privilege),] will control.
We hold that when there are federal law claims in a case also presenting
state law claims, the federal rule favoring admissibility, rather than any
state law privilege, is the controlling rule. The question is one of first im-
pression in this court, but our holding is consistent with the legislative his-
tory of rule 501 and the decisions of a number of trial courts. It is also
consistent with the general rule in federal practice disfavoring privileges not
constitutionally based.
7 4
Although accountants lost the question of a broad accountant-
client privilege in an earlier United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, 7 5 opinions by the Tenth Circuit and the Second Circuit ini-
tially gave independent accountants some prospect of protection in
tax work.76 The Tenth Circuit, in United States v Coopers &
74. Id.
75. See note 63 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and for the Tenth Circuit, see generally John R. Robinson and Clyde D.
Stoltenberg, Privilege and Accountants' Workpapers, 68 ABA J 1248 (1982); Ad Hoc Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Law and Account., A Qualified Privilege for Tax Accrual
Workpapers, 39 Bus Law 247 (Nov 1983); Comment, Protecting an Independent Account-
ant's Tax Accrual Workpapers from an Internal Revenue Service Summons, 44 Ohio St L
J 743 (1983); Katherine Pryor Burgeson, IRS Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers: Legal
Considerations and Policy Concerns, 51 Fordham L Rev 468 (1982); Galba, Evidence, 1983
Annual Survey of Am L 175, 182-87 (1983); Crocker, 11 Barrister 31 (cited in note 56);
Stone and Liebman, Testimonial Privileges § 3.03 at 214-18 (cited in note 7).
For a more general treatment of IRS procedures and the accountant, see Comment, Inter-
nal Revenue Code Summons Enforcement and the Accountant, 2 Duquesne L Rev 261
(1964); Annotation, What Constitutes Privileged Communications with Preparer of Federal
Tax Returns So As to Render Communication Inadmissible in Federal Tax Prosecution, 36
ALR Fed 686 (1978); Graves, Attorney Client Privilege in Preparation of Income Tax Re-
turns: What Every Attorney-Preparer Should Know, 42 Tax Law 577 (1989); Annotation,
Supreme Court's Construction of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 Provision (26 USCS §
7602) Authorizing Secretary of Treasury to Summon and Examine Witnesses and Books,
Papers, Records, Or Other Data, 79 L Ed 2d 1034 (1986); Comment, Accountants, Privi-
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Lybrand,7" denied the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) access to an
independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers s because the
court found that the documents were not relevant to determining
the correctness of the taxpayer's tax return. Five years later, in
United States v Arthur Young & Co.,79 the Second Circuit rejected
the lack of relevance argument, but found that limited work-prod-
uct immunity" existed for tax accrual workpapers prepared in the
course of certifying financial statements. However, on appeal, the
United States Supreme Court8 reversed the Second Circuit's deci-
sion on the issue of work product immunity and unanimously re-
fused to protect CPAs' tax accrual workpapers from disclosure
pursuant to an IRS summons."'
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arthur Young is
noteworthy for its discussion of the role of certified independent
leged Communications, "and Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 St Louis L J
252 (1965).
77. 550 F2d 615 (10th Cir 1977).
78. Under GAAP and GAAS, independent auditors must evaluate whether adequate
income tax reserves have been accrued and whether adequate disclosure has been made by
the firm with respect to the income tax provided for in the financial statements and the
estimated amount the firm may ultimately pay if its determination in questionable areas is
found to be wrong. Tax accrual workpapers document the independent accountant's investi-
gation and evaluation of a firm's contingent tax liability.
79. 677 F2d 211 (2d Cir 1982), rev'd in part, 465 US 805 (1984).
80. Work-product immunity refers to information which an qttorney secures from a
witness while acting as the client's confidential advisor and advocate in anticipation of liti-
gation. The work-product doctrine was recognized by the Supreme Court in Hickman v
Taylor, 329 US 495 (1947).
81. United States v Arthur Young & Co., 465 US 805 (1984). See generally Sheppard,
No Work Product Immunity For Accountants, Says Supreme Court, 22 Tax Notes 1277
(Mar 26, 1984); Stone and Liebman, Testimonial Privileges at 155-58 (cited in note 7).
82. Internal Revenue Code § 7602 provides that:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is
authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax ... or any other person.., to appear ... and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or
material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
IRC § 7602 (1982).
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accountants. This role, according to the Court, is quite different
from that of an attorney whose duty as a confidential advisor and
advocate is to present the client's case in its most favorable possi-
ble light. When certifying financial statements, in contrast, a CPA
assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment rela-
tionship with the client. Therefore, the independent auditor owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation's stockholders and creditors
as well as to the investing public at large:
This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain to-
tal independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity
to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public account-
ant's interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore
the significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged
with public obligations. . . . Thus, the independent auditor's obligation to
serve the public interest assures that the integrity of the securities markets
will be preserved, without the need for a work-product immunity for ac-
countants' tax accrual workpapers8 3
The United States Supreme Court's view of the role of the inde-
pendent CPA suggests that corporate clients should not expect
that communications with their accountants will be kept confiden-
tial, at least in the federal arena. However, one commentator has
cautioned against reading the opinion too broadly. Far from an-
nouncing the death penalty for the testimonial privilege or work-
product immunity for accountants, the opinion treated only inde-
pendent auditors working under the direction of federal securities
laws. Moreover, new guidelines promulgated by the IRS provide
that tax accrual workpapers will be requested only in unusual cir-
cumstances, so the fact situation and concerns raised in the Arthur
Young decision may never be replicated.
4
ACCOUNTANT ENGAGED BY ATTORNEY
As noted previously, Pennsylvania's accountant-client privilege
is not recognized in federal court. Therefore, while an accountant
cannot refuse to testify on that basis, there are situations in which
an accountant engaged by an attorney may be within the ambit of
the attorney-client privilege.8 5
83. Arthur Young, 465 US at 818-19.
84. Leading Cases of the 1983 Term: III. Federal Statutes and Regulations, 98 Harv
L Rev 247, 303 (1984).
85. See generally Comment, 2 Duquesne L Rev at 275-81 (cited in note 76) (regarding
accountants engaged by attorneys in federal tax investigations). The attorney-client privi-
lege has been extended to include communications made to the attorney's agents. Id at 275,
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In general, these situations involve an accountant being retained
by an attorney and subsequent extension of the attorney-client
privilege to the accountant just as it was extended to include com-
munications made to other agents of the attorney.s6 However, the
attorney-client privilege is not available by the mere transfer of an
accountant's documents to the client and the client's subsequent
delivery of the unprivileged materials to an attorney.8 7 The district
court in United States v Schmidt"" stated:
There are circumstances in which an accountant may be within the scope of
the attorney-client privilege, the elements of which are set forth as follows:
"(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that pur-
pose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance perma-
nently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961).
The burden of establishing the foregoing rests on the claimant against
disclosure, and the operative rule of construction is that the privilege ought
to be confined within its narrowest limits consistent with its policy to pro-
mote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients.
One corollary of the prerequisite that a professional legal adviser be con-
sulted in his capacity as such is that the privilege does not apply when a
person who merely happens to be an attorney translates his activities into
those of an accountant.
Similarly, what is vital to the assertion of the privilege by an accountant
employed by an attorney is that he assist in providing legal advice rather
than merely rendering accounting services; and the specific nature of the
proponent's burden is to establish that the accountant's role is essentially
consultative.8 9
The court went on rule that to the extent that tax return prepara-
tion requires the formulation of a legal judgment based upon prior
consultative accounting, the accounting services can be legitimately
included under the attorney-client umbrella.9 0
Despite the court's discussion in Schmidt of the topic and its
citing Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2301 at 583 (cited in note 8).
86. Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2301 at 583 (cited in note 8).
87. United States v Kelly, 311 F Supp 1216 (E D Pa 1969). In addition, the attorney
rendered no legal services regarding the materials but simply gained possession of them.
Kelly, 311 F Supp at 1218.
88. 360 F Supp 339 (M D Pa 1972).
89. Schmidt, 360 F Supp 339 at 346-47 (hereinafter "Schmidt I/") (supplementing
United States v Schmidt, 343 F Supp 444 (M D Pa 1973) (hereinafter "Schmidt I"), citing,
inter alia, United States v Gurtner, 474 F2d 297 (9th Cir 1973); United States v Cote, 456
F2d 142 (8th Cir 1972); United States v Kovel, 296 F2d 918 (2d Cir 1961) (exclusive lan-
guage in original).
90. Schmidt II, 360 F Supp at 347.
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attempt to clarify the distinction between legal advice and ac-
counting services, the two professions converge in some respects,
especially in the area of taxation. "It has been stated that a compe-
tent accountant knows more about the Internal Revenue Code
than most lawyers.""' Thus, particularly in the functional overlap-
ping field of tax practice, the dividing line separating attorneys
from accountants may be nearly invisible and troublesome for the
courts to distinguish. Consequently, determining the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege in relation to accountants may con-
tinue to be a judicial "thorn in the side."
In Schmidt, the court held that an accountant retained by the
taxpayer's attorneys to assist them in the accumulation of business
and financial information required to provide legal advice to the
taxpayer could not refuse to testify on the basis of his role as an
accountant. However, the attorney-client privilege did protect con-
fidential communications made by the taxpayer to the accountant
within the context of the attorney-client relationship. Conse-
quently, the accountant could refuse to answer questions where
providing an answer would amount to disclosure of information
communicated in professional confidence.9 2
In determining -the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
with regard to an accountant, the court in the Schmidt I and 11
litigation93 placed weight on the fact that the attorneys decided
that the accounting services were necessary to allow them to prop-
erly advise their client. Accordingly, the law firm reached an agree-
ment with the accounting firm, stipulating that, among other
things, accounting services were to be performed at the written re-
quest of counsel, that except as otherwise directed, the accountants
were to bill the law firm monthly for services rendered during the
preceding month, and that information obtained by the account-
ants while performing the services contemplated by the agreement
was to be confidential.
9 4
To summarize then:
Neither the accountant-client privilege nor the attorney-client privilege can
be claimed as to information furnished to a tax return preparer, regardless
91. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
Implications for the Privileged Communication Doctrine, 71 Yale L J 1226, 1246 (1962),
citing Charles Speed Gray, Lawyers and Accountants in Tax Practice-A Challenge to the
Bar, 15 J Tax 100, 101 (1961), quoting Dean Griswold of Harvard.
92. Schmidt 11, 360 F Supp at 348.
93. See note 89.
94. Schmidt I, 343 F Supp at 445.
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of whether the preparer is an accountant or an attorney. The attorney-client
privilege does not apply because information communicated for return
preparation is not legal advice covered by the privilege. [The accountant-
client privilege does not apply either, because it is not recognized in federal
practice.95 ] When the accountant is employed by the attorney to assist in
defense of a tax fraud case, however, communications to the accountant are
protected by the attorney-client privilege as well as the attorney-work-prod-
uct rule. But to invoke the attorney-client privilege, the accountant must
bill the attorney and be paid by the attorney. If any of the information is
used to prepare tax returns, the privilege is waived as to all data supporting
the filed returns."6
Thus, even when an accountant prepares amended tax returns at
the request of the taxpayer's attorney, the attorney-client privilege
does not prevent their subpoena because the preparation of a tax
return does not usually require legal advice.
97
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It has been reported that the primary motivation of CPAs who
favor an accountant-client privilege is to promote the client's full
disclosure of information required for the preparation of tax re-
turns. Their interest is based on the notion that the privilege
would operate to protect clients unjustly charged with fraud and to
guard against "fishing expeditions." 98 In addition, a subcommittee
of the American Bar Association has recommended a qualified
privilege for tax accrual workpapers 9 Seemingly in response to
the wishes of these accountants and attorneys, legislation was pro-
posed to enact a limited accountant-client privilege in tax matters.
In early 1990, a bill was introduced in the Senate, amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence to establish a tax preparer's privilege
for lawyers and accountants doing tax work.100 The statute, if en-
acted as written, would make privileged, in the courts of the
United States, the communications between a client and a lawyer
or an accountant relating to the preparation of a tax return for the
client. Confidentiality would not apply to accounting matters unre-
95. Couch, 409 US at 335.
96. Causey and McNair, 27 Am Bus L J at 537-38 (cited in note 3) (citations
omitted).
97. Stone and Liebman, Testimonial Privileges at 158 (cited in note 7), citing United
States v McFadden & Co., 1989 Dist Ct LEXIS 88-2285 (W D Pa).
98. Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-Accountant and Client, 46 NC L
Rev 419, 424 (1968).
99. Ad Hoc Subcomm. of the Comm. on Law and Account., 39 Bus Law 247 (cited in
note 76).
100. S 2452, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (1990), in 136 Cong Rec 4209, 4275 (1990).
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lated to tax preparation, nor to communications in anticipation of
criminal activity or fraud.101
The 1990 bill apparently died in committee, but in August of
1991, a similar amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence was
proposed as part of a larger bill to amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.102 The bill, introduced in the Senate and called the
Fairplay for Taxpayers Act of 1991, includes wording which would
create a federal privilege for communications between a client and
a lawyer, an accountant, or an enrolled agent with respect to the
preparation of tax return.10 3 The bill was referred to the Commit-
tee on Finance for further consideration."" The Fairplay for Tax-
payers Act of 1992 was introduced into the House of Representa-
tives on February 25, 1992, and included the identical provision. 0 5
CONCLUSION
The accountant-client privilege remains a valuable protection for
accountants and their clients in Pennsylvania. However, limita-
tions on the privilege's use, exceptions to its coverage and condi-
tions of its waiver significantly restrict its application. Neverthe-
less, in certain circumstances, even where the accountant-client
privilege is not available, confidential accounting communications
may be shielded from disclosure under the auspices of the attor-
ney-client privilege.
Pennsylvania's statutory accountant-client privilege prohibits
the disclosure of any client information communicated to a li-
censed accountant employed in a confidential relationship with the
101. Id.
102. S 1617, 102d Cong, 1st Sess, in 137 Cong Rec S 11813, 11814, 11816 (Aug 1, 1991).
103. Id. Under the proposed amendments, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 would read as
follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and as otherwise required by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
(b) The communications between a lawyer, an accountant, or an enrolled agent
with respect to the preparation of a tax return for a client and the client shall be
privileged in the courts of the United States.
Id.
104. Id at 11814.
105. HR 4309, 138 Cong Rec E423, E424 (Feb 25, 1992).
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client and to the accountant's employees and associates. The privi-
lege may be asserted only by the client and it may be waived by
the client or by the client's personal representatives, heirs or suc-
cessors by consenting to the disclosure or by placing the otherwise
privileged communication in issue in litigation. The law remains
unclear as to whether a joint client may invoke the privilege
against the other joint client, such as husband against wife, partner
against partner, or corporation against shareholder.
In general, the Pennsylvania privilege statute protects informa-
tion communicated by clients to their accountants in their profes-
sional capacity. However, the protection does not extend to audit
reports or disciplinary hearings, investigations, or lawsuits in which
the accountant is a party and the accounting services are relevant.
Because the accountant-client privilege is not recognized by fed-
eral law, the protection it affords does not extend to disputes with
the IRS and other federal cases. Nevertheless, in some limited cir-
cumstances, confidential information obtained by an accountant
engaged by an attorney may be protected from disclosure by the
operation of the attorney-client privilege. Generally these limited
circumstances would not include situations where information is
used in the preparation of tax returns unless proposed federal leg-
islation creating a tax preparer's privilege is enacted.
The import of the foregoing discussion should be obvious: famil-
iarization with the statutory accountant-client privilege and vigi-
lant monitoring of the case law which interprets it is necessary for
accountants and their attorneys in order to identify and eliminate
potential areas of exposure.
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